"Why Feel Bad?" A Theory of Affect (emotions) and the relationship to
Pentecostal Spirituality. BRUCE STEVENS
Introduction
Christian counselling is a practice largely in search of a theory. There is no one theoretical approach universally accepted, and while this is perhaps inevitable in our ‘market place of ideas’, it also reflects a lack of willingness to do the hard work of theory building. In this paper I will propose a theory of affect drawing on the psychoanalytic tradition and developmental research. Psychoanalysis provides a very sophisticated theory of personality which has been increasingly both challenged and confirmed by empirical research. Hopefully this will illustrate the size of the task before us.
I also want to raise some issues about the way emotions are understood in some Pentecostal churches. If preaching is anything to go by, there is a lack of acceptance of negative emotions. Perhaps it is considered bad PR to acknowledge that Christians might suffer. In a previous generation this was expressed more theologically, with an impatience to get to the ‘Victory in Christ’ (a misreading of 1Cor15:57).
If we understand why we experience emotions, both positive and negative, then it will be more clearly seen that ‘positive thinking’ or ‘simple faith’ will not work in this realm. There is a structure of what it means to be human, this is the ‘hard ware’ designed by God which naturally limits any ‘soft ware’ applications!
Considering Affect
The word ‘affect’ derives from the Greeks who used it to denote states of mind characterized by feelings.1 It is often used interchangeably with feeling and emotion, but affect includes more than subjective feelings: ‘affects encompasses activating or inhibiting, hedonic, adaptive, communicative, and neuro-physiological aspects. Affects are related to motivation, cognition and behaviour. Although influenced by maturation, development, and life experience, by society and culture, affects are also innate and genetically determined.’2 Affect is the umbrella term; it is all encompassing. Emotion is the subjective awareness of the meaning of affect for the self (Basch,1976).3 Mood states are even more complex.4
Affect is one of the most difficult topics in psychoanalysis. There is no cohesive theory of affect, as has been observed with some regularity.5 The prospect of a ‘unified theory of affect’ is increasingly difficult – perhaps impossible.
The central problem is elaborating a theory that simultaneously satisfies a number of viewpoints including biological6, observational7, developmental, dynamic, economic and structural.8 Such a comprehensive theory would have to do justice to an individual’s subjective experience in daily life and translate into the clinical situation.9 My task is more modest, that of a theory of functioning, but this is daunting enough. Like climbing in the foothills of the Himalayan range but not ascending Everest!
Freud
A place to begin our theoretical journey is with Freud. He has been the dominant figure in understand the psyche for much of the last century. But his views on affects changed over the decades of his writing. In the first phase Freud equated affect with a quantity of psychic energy (Affektbetrag) which provides every psychic event with a measurable quantity of affect10. In Studies in Hysteria (1895) he presented a theory of blocked affect. The solution in his ‘talking cure’ was that language could function as a substitute for action. In therapy there is a discharge of dammed-up affect which drains the pathogenic idea of its force and influence. For Freud the ‘role of the psychic apparatus is to divest itself of excessive excitations which interfere with functioning.’11
This was also associated with his theory of psychic trauma in which traumatic experience was associated with negative affects and a large quantity would overwhelm the helpless ego and thus be experienced as traumatic.12 Recovery depended on the recapture of the traumatic memories or reconstruction of the traumatic situation with associated affects.13
The second phase began with The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) which was characterised by a greater systematization of psychoanalytic ideas. Freud achieved his goal of a theory of psychological functioning but the focus was more on representations to the detriment of affects. Although he dedicated a section to affects in the chapter on dream work, the role of affect was secondary. The meaning of the dream is more important than the experience. Affects in their raw state are failures of the dream work.14
In what has been called his ‘Topographic Theory’ Freud considered affects to be controlled from the unconscious: ‘this is regarded as a motor or secretory function, the key to the innervation of which is to be found in the ideas of the Unconscious.’ Affects are released by and indicate unconscious wishes.15 Drives are diminished by affect-discharge (both what is felt and what is expressed). The major implication is that affect expression is the outcome of the discharge of part of the accumulated drive-cathexis when direct discharge cannot take place – it is a ‘safety valve’. It is not a simple response to a stimulus, but at least two directly competing tendencies resulting in what Landauer called ‘inherited hysterical attacks’16. Fundamentally it was an id theory of affects17.
In Freud’s paper ‘The Unconscious’ (1915) he raised the question of the existence of unconscious feelings. If there are unconscious perceptions there must be unconscious affects.18 He remained faithful to his conception of inhibition of affects - making them unconscious. Content, in contrast to affect, can appear in disguises.
The third phase was what has been called Freud’s ‘Structural Theory’ but a systematic presentation of a theory of affect was not presented (later attempts were made by Hartmann, Kris and Rapaport). Freud ushered this stage in with The Ego and the Id (1923), where the conflicts of the id recur and involve higher levels of psychic functioning ‘The struggle that once raged in the deepest strata of the mind… is now carried on a higher region’ (31: p. 53). There was little about affect but much about guilt, both conscious and unconscious. In the simplest of terms guilt derives from conflict between the ego and the super-ego. The discussion of unconscious guilt implied the conception of defence against affects.
The Problem of Anxiety (1926) was a major contribution. Ego Psychology came from a new understanding of anxiety and defences. While Freud wrote about anxiety, the potential application of the theory is wider. The ego was portrayed as stronger and no longer at the mercy of affects, but able to gain control. Affects appeared as ego-functions, no longer safety valves, but used as signals by the ego, so producing affects actively. He implied the innate character of some basic affect-discharge channels, and even their thresholds and relation to releasing stimuli. There was a distinction between signal and traumatic anxiety19. The gulf between affect and thought was reduced, ‘The theory gave affective life the possibility of functioning in a way analogous to thought’.20 Analytic treatment using the transference21, gave affect an increasingly important part to play. Tyson (1996) noted that affect regulation depends upon the capacity of the child and later adult to use the signal function of affect.22
An object relational23 perspective became important. Freud noted that when the infant discovers that the mother can dissipate danger, fear is displaced onto object-related situations (fears of object loss, loss of the object’s love, castration and super ego punishment). With this addition Freud made affect theory developmentally relevant and sufficiently broad that the remnants of his earlier theory became a ‘special case’.24
Psychoanalytic Theorists after Freud
Since Freud there have been many significant contributions to a psychoanalytic understanding of affect.25 I will mention just a few in passing. Ego psychology was concerned with affect maturation through transformations such as delay, tolerance, binding and defence. H. Hartmann (1952) linked affects to developing ego functions and noted ‘an element of constancy gradually developing in what we describe as libidinal or aggressive object cathexis… The child leans to recognize ‘things’ probably only in the process of forming more or less constant object relationships.’26
Roy Schafer (1964) brought a helpful clinical perspective to understanding affect, again linking affects to object relations ‘on analysis we find that some affects, such as are involved in self-loathing and pride, are experienced as emanating from internalized objects; other affects, such as the apprehensiveness associated with suspiciousness, the anger associated with rebelliousness, and the misery associated with masochistic propitiation, are directed at the internalized objects; and some, such as remorse concerning seductiveness, spitefulness or withdrawal, are reactions to impulses ascribed to the self and directed towards against or away from these objects.’27
Otto Kernberg retained a clear structural perspective in his understanding of psychological phenomena. He used the term affect, within a developmental paradigm, to describe a broad spectrum from primitive affect states to cognitively differentiated toned-down and subtle emotions. Reflecting on transference he concluded that affects always have an ideational content or a cognitive component which is important for the psychoanalytic exploration of affects. Indeed, the transference, an affect state, always ‘signals and actualizes’ a significant past object-relation. The object-relational link is central to his understanding, ‘Affects imply a relationship between a total or partial aspect of the patient’s self and a total or partial aspect of some of his object representations.’28
In Object Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis 29 he argued that affects are the earliest motivational system, in the course of linking infant and parent the predominant quality of love or hatred becomes enriched and modulated so that eventually the internal relation is more than a finite number of concrete loving or hateful affect states. Love and hatred become stable intrapsychic structures, though libido and aggression become the primary motivational systems – affects have become integrated into drives. He concluded that ‘Affects, in short, are the building blocks or constituents of drives; affects eventually acquire a signal function for the activation of drives.’30 Affect, according to Kernberg, is part of what is internalized with object relations.
A Developmental Perspective
Daniel Stern argued, from research data, that there is no symbiotic union.31 ‘Infants begin to experience a sense of an emergent self from birth. They are pre-designed to be aware of self-organizing processes. They never experience a period of total self/other un-differentiation. There is no confusion between self and other in the beginning or at any point during infancy.’32
The infant, following birth, is immersed in a relational matrix. If fortunate the patterns will be mostly positive with caring, nurture, empathic understanding, and adequate protection. But family life is rarely tranquil. There will also be negative interactions: with explosions of anger, attempts to punish others for transgressions, judgments, aloof expressions of contempt, and acts to evoke shame. All this contributes to the emotional climate inhabited by the infant, later child and adolescent.
It is a relational context, one in which an infant will observe how A treats B, an action captured by transitive verbs.33 Naturally the actors will include care-takers, including mother and father. What will be most important is the relationship patterns between the infant and carers, but also between significant others. It is important for the infant to learn how to influence those who give nurture and what behaviour will illicit a response. The circle of observation and experience would also include others in the family with siblings, relatives and perhaps family friends.34 While subtleties may be lost on the infant, there will be an appreciation of attention, touch, feeding, comfort and overall emotional expression.
In an important paper Beebe, Lachmann and Jaffe (1997) examined the pre-symbolic origins of self and object representations with a focus on inter-relatedness. They maintain ‘It is the dyad, rather than the individual, which is the unit of organization.’35 Continuity is at the level of relationship patterns. The early interaction structures organize experience. This is not a linear model but a ‘transformational model’ with mutual transformations and restructurings – active reorganization. They reviewed and reported on findings in infant research to make some interesting conclusions, ‘Infants are given auditory and visual stimuli over and over. When they stop attending to stimuli they have habituated, and habituated is an index of schema formation… the ability to form a schema is an index of a primitive capacity to categorize and create representations, and it predicts developmental outcomes.’36 Bucci (1985) has argued that there are two parallel systems of representation, verbal and nonverbal, and that both develop representational capacities. The verbal mode stores information in linguistic form; in the nonverbal information is stored in the perceptual modes such as image, sound or smell.37 These provide later, largely unconscious, organizing structures.
Tronick et al (1978) developed an interesting strategy for infant research known as ‘still-face paradigm’. Following two minutes of natural play between the mother and infant, the mother is instructed to face the infant without moving her face or vocalizing. Usually the infant will make repeated efforts to greet the mother (smiling and cooing) and cycle through disengagement and repeated efforts to elicit a response.38 In later research Tronick (1989) demonstrated that the effects of still-face experiment persist for several minutes after the resumption of normal play. The infant shows a negative mood and avoids looking at the mother. This implies that events have lasting effects because they are internally represented.39 This also underlines the relationship between interpersonal experience, internally represented, and positive and negative affect.
Cohn, Campbell and Ross (1992) have shown that by six months the infant’s style of coping with the still-face situation has become stable and that it predicts an infant’s attachment status at one year – if the infant persists with trying to engage the mother then a secure attachment is more likely. This indicates the infant’s ‘working model’ or ‘representation’ of what he or she expects will engage the care-taker.
Beebe et al (1997a) use this and other research to support their view that ‘self and object and their representations are rooted in relationship structures holds true only as long as relationship structures are broadly construed to include self-regulation with interactive regulation processes.’40 Structure occurs with both the repeat of what is expected and what is repaired.41 In summary their dyadic systems position is ‘Mother and infant jointly construct a patterned sequence of movements, and the rules for regulating these movements, through the dimensions of time, space, affect and arousal. It is this interactive process, the expectation of a characteristic patterns of the dyadic sequence of movements, together with self-regulatory consequences, that is represented by the infant. We employ a continuous process model of representations, in which the infant represents the moment to moment dynamic interplay of his or her actions in relation to the actions of the mother (care-taker). Thus was what is initially represented is not an object, but an object-relation: self-in-relation-to-object.’42
But object-relation is not the whole story. It is also important to recognise affect. Sandler (1978) noted ‘In the development of object relationships the part played by affective experience is central. An experience only has or retains its meaning for the child if it is linked with feeling.’43
Towards a Relational Theory of Affect
Psychological structures are biologically prepared in our species, develop in the specific context of the infant-care giver relationship, and persist throughout life. The first care-giving relationships are formative because internalization happens at the same time as representations of self and others are first taking place.44 With emotionally available parenting a child will consolidate an affective core of self, develop a sense of reciprocity, empathy, an appreciation of rules as well as early aspects of morality. Affect is there from the psychological beginnings of life.45
In the psyche objects are linked by relational patterns. I would use the analogy of a guitar string. The objects (including self and other) are the two bridges which anchor the string to the instrument, the string is the relational pattern, but affect is the emotional tone – the vibration of the string sounding a note. Naturally, two objects can have various relational ties and associated affects, like playing a chord on the guitar.
Affect is part of what ‘links’ objects in a relationship, and will then ‘linger’ with an after effect. This can help to explain distressing affects. Disappointment or loss in a relationship is linked to sadness. Frustration about a lack of responsiveness from a carer may be internalized. If an infant or young child has internalized punitive patterns then emotions such as anxiety and fear will be troubling. The relational pattern and associated affects will have an internal and largely unconscious life of their own. The adult, who experienced early disturbed relationships, will still be troubled by negative affect perhaps resulting in anxiety, panic and mood disorders. Ultimately this will contribute to problems in emotional regulation in some personality disorders (eg Histrionic and Borderline).
This is vividly illustrated in Henrik Ibsen’s play ‘A Doll’s House’ (1879, movie 1973). The young wife Nora is in a suffocating marriage with Torvald, a ‘benevolent’ but patronizing and controlling man. She finally confronts her husband and reflects on her life, ‘I have been treated most unjustly first by father and then by you… When I was at home with father, he fed me all his opinions. He used to call me his doll child, just as I played with my dolls. And when I moved into your house… You have always been so kind to me, but our house has never been anything but a play room, here I was your doll wife. Just as at home I was my father’s doll wife and my children as well. They have been my dolls.’ The marriage to Torvald was based on ‘what felt familiar’ and she played out early relationship patterns. The play explores her unhappy emotions related to powerlessness, feeling controlled and trapped – eventually relief and freedom as she makes her ‘escape’ as an adult.
Another possible ‘source’ of affective disturbance is childhood trauma. This will have a relational component, though it is possible that a child might find a single incident, perhaps perpetrated by a stranger, to be highly traumatic. I would suggest that it is not enough to deal with the emotional aftermath, say though cathartic therapy, but the internalized relationship would also be part of the legacy of the trauma and eventual treatment. This may also assist in understanding why some kinds of traumatic experience are more resistant to therapeutic help.
If a client works on childhood sexual abuse in therapy, then there will be many ‘fruits of such labour’ hopefully leading to potentially healthy intimate relationships. But the result will also include ‘lessening the grip’ of associated negative affects such as sadness, guilt, anger, fear, apprehension, and disgust. If this progresses well then there may a lift of mood and less distress. Leaff (1971) concluded ‘although there are many indices of psychic integration and functioning – eg. adaptive behaviours, object relatedness, sublimation - the stability and quality of an individual’s feeling life is of such importance as scarcely to be doubted.’46
‘What I experience as a feeling’ is fundamental to my personality - the fabric of my self. At the most fundamental layer of self, we find internalized relationship patterns and associated affects. What needs to change is the experience of relationships, perhaps beginning with the counsellor and extending to other healthy relationships, only then will emotional experience dramatically change. And Pentecostal faith adds the vividness of life in the Spirit to the process of emotional transformation. This will be further explored in the final section.
About Pentecostal Faith
In our culture, what is instant has deep appeal. For a while most people drank only instant coffee. But now there is a wide appreciation for ground coffee and the variety in our café culture. Indeed, Gloria Jeans has provided an opportunity for me to purchase a good cup of coffee after church! But there has been a spiritual equivalent of ‘instant coffee’, which takes the form of ‘instant blessing’.
I recently read through a number of decades of magazines produced by the Assemblies of God in Australia. In the early decades there was more of a healthy balance in dealing with emotions. In an early issue of the Messenger E. Williams (1935) preached on the ‘Valley of Baca’, and noted:
The way to the celestial city leads the Christian pilgrim through many valleys, one of which is the Valley of Baca. The word ‘baca’ means weeping. Jesus wept, Paul wept, Jeremiah was the weeping prophet and all good people have wept. Life brings with it many sorrows. But we must not too long remain in the Valley of Baca. The blessed man is he who is but ‘passing through’.47
There was an acceptance of broadly negative emotions including sadness, regret, melancholy, distrust and doubt (which are listed). The preacher went on to encourage the listener to find the divine blessing ‘that God wishes us to find there’48 and then move on. I think that there was a healthy balance in earlier fundamentalism in accepting that Christians will suffer, but later receive an eternal reward.
The next decade was overshadowed by a global war. Naturally this was not a context that emotions can be readily ignored. Dr Jerrett (1943) recalled the decline of his wife with cancer over ‘13 weeks of suffering’ but God sustained him and his family.49 The vivid experience of ‘Baptism in the Spirit’ was understood to give strength in suffering.
There were many changes to Australian Pentecostalism in the wake of WW2. While the travelling preachers from the USA came before, now there was a greater exposure from believers who came as soldiers on R&R. High profile healing evangelists and conference speakers came in the 1950’s. Perhaps this contributed to something of a change in the preaching of the 1960’s. I could be over highlighting a contrast with the ‘Valley of Baca’, but E. M. Irish (1963) preached a message ‘On the mountain top!!’ (yes, two exclamation marks). This preacher listed the benefits of ascending the mountain ‘we can rejoice in the Lord for that he has appointed us to a mountain top experience in his grace and blessing!!’50 Slowly there was a greater recognition of what might be loosely termed psychological states but not with psychological language or diagnoses. It is interesting to note a shift to the denial of negative feelings in a sermon by F. J. Miles (1965). His theme was joy. He challenged the common view of Jeremiah as a weeping prophet, instead Jeremiah stood for righteousness.51 This might be a reflection of the prosperity and social stability of the previous decade. Perhaps even a greater optimism which was evident in the sermons. But I think it is more likely that a form of preaching emerged that was impatient with suffering and anything less than being victorious in Christ.
It was becoming more common to find the expression of a formula for healing. Percy Brewster (1973) stated: ‘There is nothing mystical about divine healing. It is the gift of God, like salvation, and we appropriate it through simple faith. What God has said he will surely do. Believe it, and healing will come.’52
In the following decade Ronald Dayman (1984), encouraged his listeners, ‘You need to refuse defeat and accept the victory… never allow defeat to be part of your thinking for we have the victory.’ 53
In the 1990’s society was changing. Increasingly psychological issues were addressed. National superintendent Andrew Evans (1996) acknowledged a reality of personal struggle but the expressed the answer: ‘If we constantly maintain a Spirit-filled life through fellowship with the Holy Spirit, we will find ourselves conquering those fleshly attitudes and wrong character traits.’54 The sincere believer was increasingly expected to unlock the stores of heaven with the key of faith.
John Warwick (1997) began by acknowledging the obvious fact that Christians will have problems, and he lamented the ‘amount of counselling Christians undergo is phenomenal’ but they are in God’s kingdom, ‘Christians have been set free from Satan’s grip, chains, death hold and the power of sin. We are free – absolutely and gloriously!’55 He argued for the need to believe God’s word, the promises ‘Everything for victory belongs to those who are born again… That simple faith of believing the gospel is the same faith God wants us to continue to display throughout our Christian walk.’56
In this small sample of Pentecostal preaching over fifty years, it is apparent that there has been an increasing denial of negative emotions. There is a growing reluctance to acknowledge that sadness and other negative emotions are normal. Instead inspirational sermons leave the listener with the impression that a healing formula will work for them. All this contributes to an artificiality in fellowship and pastoral care that borders on being uncaring, ‘Believe the Word…’
And what is a believer to do? It is easier, of course, to appear happy. This is a form of pretence (even to oneself) that can be successful for a while, perhaps even for decades, but will almost inevitably breakdown into a serious psychological illness or a physical manifestation. When we understand the nature of affect, or more narrowly emotions in general, then it is easy to see that there are no short-cuts.
I do not for a moment suggest that counselling is the answer. It may help but if therapy is to be of assistance it will need to address the internalized relationship patterns that I have identified as being the source of emotional disturbance. I think that a lot of current counselling styles, including those very much in vogue in wider society and offered by mental health professionals, fail on this point. For example, forms of counselling based on altering behaviour or irrational thoughts (CBT Therapy) will not ultimately be transformative. There is an underlying assumption that ‘reality is what you make of it’57
The ultimate challenge is to provide a different climate of relationships. This begins with a God who offers us a healthy and healing relationship through Christ, ‘I am the way, the truth and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by me.’ (John 14: 6) The church as the ‘body of Christ’ (1Cor12) offers the opportunity to be part of a healing community. This can extend to nurturing a healthy family life and guidance in reshaping relationships with the family-of-origin. The very great strength of Pentecostalism is the value placed on a shared religious experience called ‘Baptism in the Spirit’. It is this vibrant experience which has been formative of our community life.
The experience of ‘Baptism in the Spirit’ provides an affective flooding in the joy of the Spirit which is experienced as emotionally healing. This can be transformative in the inner emotional life of the believer - though not completely. There is always the eschatological tension between the ‘already’ and the ‘not yet’ of the Kingdom of God.
The only way to change the real source of negative emotions is to have healing relationships, as intense as the primary relationships that formed the self, but more respecting and responsive to fundamental needs. Ultimately this is only possible through a relationship with God. It is a long road to lasting change.
Dr Bruce A Stevens is Director of Counselling at the Graduate School of Southern Cross College and Adjunct Senior Lecturer in Clinical Psychology at the University of Canberra. He has a private practice with Canberra Clinical and Forensic Psychology. He has a PhD (Boston University, 1987) and is a practicing psychologist (MAPS, Forensic College).
Endnotes:
1
Louis Leaff, ‘Affect versus feeling: On the concept of structuralized ego response’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 19, (1971): 780-788, 780. In part the confusion is that affect continues to be used both as a clinical term and as a meta-psychological concept.2
Blum, H. ‘Affect theory and the theory of technique’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 39S, (1991): 265-289, 266.3
Basch, M. ‘The concept of affect: A re-examination’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 24, (1976): 759-777, 770. Basch noted, ‘There are basic affective expressions common to human infants and adults, as well as to other mammals, that are stereotyped, universal and involuntary suggests that affect, so called, is in fact an onto- and phylogenetically early form of communication", p. 775-776. Also ‘Feelings do not exist in isolation. They have definite stable associations with symbolic, cognitive, experiential representations as well as with instinctual derivatives, unconscious fantasies, and drive discharge,’ Leaff, ‘Affect versis fee;omg" Pm tje cpmcce[t pf a structuralized ego response,’ Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 19 (1971): 780-786, 783.4
Blum, Affect Theory, 283.5
Most persuasively by Rapaport, D. ‘On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects’, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 34 (1953): 177-198; but also Samuel Novey, ‘A clinical view of affect theory in psychoanalysis’, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 40, (1959): 94-104.6
Allan Schore, (1994) Affect regulation and the origin of the self: The neurobiology of emotional development, Erbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ. Also the more recent Schore Affect regulation and the repair of the self, W. W. Norton, New York, 2003.7
There has been a wealth of infant observational data in psychoanalysis. Also note the highly influential work of Tomkins, S. S., Affect, Imagery, Consciousness (Vols 1 and 2), Springer, New York, 1962-1963.8
The importance of looking to a range of fields is articulated by Basch, M. F. ‘The significance of a theory of affect for psychoanalytic technique’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 39S, (1991): 291-304, see page 295. This is especially important for understanding the pre-verbal period.9
Ana-Maria Rizzuto, a review of Affects as Process: An inquiry into the centrality of affect in psychological life, 1997, by Jones, J. M., in Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 45, (1995): 973-978, 973.10
See Freud ‘Neuro-psychoses of Defence’ SE3,(1894): 45-61.11
Andre Green, ‘Conceptions of Affect’, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 58, (1977): 129-156, 131. Freud’s view was very much rational, or modern, as Green noted ‘the goal of the psychic apparatus is less to derive the maximum from the wealth of affective experience than to be able to master such an experience by thought and confront it with the known facts of the external and internal worlds’, p. 131.12
Tyson, T, ‘Psychic Structure formation: The complimentary roles of affects, drives, object relations and conflict’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 36S, (1988): 73-98, see page 78.13
Blum, Affect theory, 268.14
Green, Conceptions of Affect, 133.15
Rapaport, Pychoanalytic Theory, 181.16
Landauer, K., ‘Affects, passions and temperament’, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 19 (1938): 388-415, p. 390.17
Freud distinguished the id-ego-superego, with the id being the drives towards gratification.18
Hans Loewald’s point in a panel discussion, Castelnuovo-Tedesco, P. ‘Toward a theory of affects’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 22 (1973): 612-625, 624.19
Remains the expression of psychic disorganization.20
Green, Conceptions of Affect, 138.21
Transference is a label for the dynamic of the patient experiencing emotions relating to significant individuals prior to the experience of analysis with the therapist but transferred on to him or her. This gives a ‘here and now’ quality to treatment.22
Tyson, P. ‘Object relations, affect management, and psychic structure formation’, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 51, (1996): 172-189; esp. 175-176.23
Object is a term in psychoanalysis for a representation of a person. More specifically it is the internal mental representation in the psyche. There are relational aspects between internalized objects, hence the general term object-relations.24
Tyson, P. Object relations, 78.25
This is well reviewed by Andre Green, The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse, Routledge, London, 1973, trans English 1999.26
Hartmann, H., ‘Mutual influences in the development of Ego and Id’, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, 7, (1952): 9-30, 22-23.27
Schafer, R. ‘The clinical analysis of Affects’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 12, 275-299, 283.28
Hartocollis, P. and Lester, E. P. ‘New Directions in Affect Theory’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30 (1982): 197-211, which summarizes a paper by Kernberg, ‘The place of affects in the clinical situation and in psychoanalytic theory’, quoted p. 200. See also Kissen, M., Affect, Object and Character Structure, International Universities Press, Madison, CT, 1995; ‘link the inner self and object world through essentially coherent and useful signals and bits of information with regard to values, needs, wishes, fantasies, self, object, and body representations’, p. 14. He concluded that ‘Affects, operating as the earliest motivational system, are therefore intimately linked with the fixation of memory of an internalized world of object relations.’ Kernberg in the earlier paper ‘Structural derivatives of Object Relationships’, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 47, (1966): 236-252. Also Kernberg, O., ‘Self, Ego, Affects and Drives’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 30, (1982): 893-917, Qp. 907.29
Kernberg, O. Object Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis, Aronson, New York, 1976.30
Kernberg, Object Relations, 908.31
This was Freud’s idea and largely accepted in psychoanalytic theory until the research of Stern and the other developmental researchers.32
Stern, 1985, 10.33
Or there can be implied mutuality.34
This does not require higher level developmental achievements, after all a newly hatched chick will quickly learn pecking order - a simple relational pattern.35
Beebe B., Lachmann F., and Laffe, J., ‘Mother infant interaction structures and Presymbolic Self and object representations’, Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 7, (1997a): 133-182, Qp. 135.36
Beebe et al, Presymbolic self, 144.37
Bucci, W., ‘Dual coding: A cognitive model for psychoanalytic research’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 33, (1985): 571-608.38
Troncik, E., Als, H., Adamson L., Wise, S. and Brazelton, T., ‘The infant’s response to entrapment between contradictory messages in face to face interaction’, American Academy of Child Psychiatry, 17, (1978): 1-17.39
Tronick, E. (1989), ‘Emotions and emotional communication in Infants’, American Psychologist, 44, pp. 112-119.40
Beebe et al, Presymbolic self, 154-155.41
Beebe et al, ‘A transformational model of Presymbolic representations: Reply to commentaries’, Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 7, (1997b): 215-224, also (1997a), p. 163.42
Beebe et al, Presymbolic self, 172. Note that self and object representations are simultaneously constructed, in relation to each other. It is an emergent dyadic phenomenon that can not be described in terms of one side alone, cf A sado-masochist pattern existing together, though roles can change.43
Sandler, J. and Sandler, A., ‘On the development of Object Relationships and Affects’, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 59, (1978): 285-296, Qp. 292.44
Emde, R., ‘Mobilizing fundamental modes of development: Empathic availability and therapeutic action’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 38, (1990): 881-913, see 883-884.45
Sandler and Sandler, On the development of Object Relationships, ‘We want to stress that it is not the mother that has yet become the ‘good’ or ‘nice’ object, but rather the dynamic gestalt of interaction experiences arising from the interrelation between the mother and child. With the later development of boundaries between the self and object, the child will attempt to restore his relationship to the earlier pleasurable affect states, by making use of the dialogue which has developed between himself and his mother,’ p. 294.46
L. Leaff, ‘Affect versus feeling: On the concept of a structuralized ego response’, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 19, (1971): 780-786, Q p.783.47
E. Williams, ‘Valley of Baca’, Glad Tidings Messenger 1/4 (Feb 1935): 5.48
Ibid, p. 5.49
H. Jerrett, ‘This Sickness for God’s Glory’, Glad Tidings Messenger 9/8, (July 1943): 19-23.50
E. M. Irish, ‘On the Mountain Top!!’, The Australian Evangel 20/5 (May, 1963): 10.51
F. J. Miles, ‘Jeremiah, Jesus and Joy’, The Australian Evangel 22/4 (April 1965): 12-13.52
Percy Brewster, ‘Supernatural Healing’, The Australian Evangel 30/7 (1973 July): 7.53
Ronald Dayman, ‘Victory belongs to the Lord’, The Australian Evangel 41/1 (January 1984): 5.54
Andrew Evans, ‘Living up to Jesus Example’, Australian Evangel (March 1996): 50.55
John Warwick, ‘Everything we need’, Australian Evangel (Feb 1997): 31.56
Ibid, p. 32.57
Street, H. "Who will you be when you are happy? The experience of happiness in the prevention and treatment of depression", in refereed section, Psychotherapy in Australia, 9:4, (2003): 14-18, 15.©Southern Cross College, 2006