Loving the Unknown?: Predestination and Foreknowledge in Open Theism
By Stephen J. Wright
Catholic Institute of Sydney, Student
The affirmation that God is sovereign and has complete knowledge of one’s future allows many evangelical Christians to sleep soundly at night. Security in God’s absolute providence and transcendence is particularly strong within the reformed stream of evangelicalism. However a clamour in the streets threatens sleepless nights for the elect; that clamour is the resounding revision of theology proper propounded by the open theist view. [1]
Openness theology departs from traditional assumptions drawn from Greek philosophy regarding the divine nature and attributes that, the openness perspective avers, are alien to the God of the Bible. [2] A predominantly evangelical theology, open theism operates under the assumption that the "God of the gospel is not the god of philosophy, at least not of Hellenic philosophy." [3] The resultant situation is one in which the proponents of openness theology are calling upon the theological community to approach the scriptural account as the prime source of our knowledge of divine attributes, rather than attempting to baptise Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover and the divine attributes that such a deity entails. Arguably an extreme form of evangelical Arminianism, openness theology furthermore seeks to maintain a libertarian notion of human freedom. [4]
The disparities between openness theology and Calvinism, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy are somewhat self-evident. Perhaps slightly less obvious, though not unacknowledged, is the variance between Arminianism and open theism. [5] As the openness view was born from the Arminian evangelical milieu and its prime proponents remain evangelical scholars the scope of this paper will extend to the limits of evangelicalism. [6] A conventional Arminian, I find the redefinition of divine omniscience by open theism unnecessary, nonetheless I seek to treat their position with fairness in this paper with the hope that the account given will make room for further dialogue between open theists and conventional Arminianism.
It is the contention of this paper that an account of predestination and election unto salvation (both of which traditionally appeal to some sense of divine foreknowledge) is necessary for the task of openness theology and that such an account may bring its own distinctives worthy of consideration by other theologies. [7] The achievement of this goal will entail four steps: firstly, an examination of the nature of openness theology as a biblical theology; secondly an account of the openness perspective on the nature of divine foreknowledge; thirdly a consideration of the place of election and predestination within openness theology critiqued on its own terms; finally a proposal of four possible directions in which the open view may wish to go in resolving its predestinarian views will be offered, one of which may prove tenable. Little attention will be given to the differing hermeneutics employed in the construction of the open and classic theistic views, however such an enterprise may be undertaken by others and would no doubt prove enlightening for the content of this paper.
Searching for the Canonical Deity
The impetus for the open theist revision of the doctrine of God arose from the old tensions between Athens and Jerusalem, philosophy and theology, tradition and scripture. The evangelical disposition favours the priority of scripture in this dialectic tension. [8] It is the contention of openness theology (and evangelical theology) that the Christian God is the God of the Bible, not of a monotheistic philosophical system. [9] Expounding upon the philosophical aspects of openness theology’s rejection of the conventional conception of God’s timelessness William Hasker appeals to priority of the canon: "the time has now come for a decisive break from a doctrine that has in it so much of pagan speculation and so little that is biblical and Christian." [10] Even in philosophy, it seems, scripture trumps all. [11] Thus, open theists have undertaken to excise from theology the philosophical attributes of divinity that are seen to be foreign to the God of the Bible.
When searching out the canonical deity, it is proffered, there is no reason to describe as anthropomorphic scriptural passages which offend philosophical conceptions of divine simplicity, immutability, impassibility, and exhaustive foreknowledge. The God of the Bible often acts in a manner conditioned by creatures, experiences emotion including suffering, changes his mind, seeks out information and takes risks in bringing forward his plans for the future. [12]
The point to be made here is that openness theology purports to prioritise the plain interpretation of biblical texts over extra-biblical philosophical assumptions regarding the divine nature. The consistent application of this hermeneutic requires the resolution of biblical language, taken as literally as possible, with the resultant theological framework regarding the divine nature arrived at by the initial application of this hermeneutic. [13] Open theism, as a theological framework with its particular hermeneutic, needs to reconcile biblical language to its proposed biblical conception of God if its claims are to survive serious scrutiny. In short, as a biblical theology it needs to take biblical language seriously. This paper will proceed to examine this task of open theism in relation to the biblical language of predestination and election unto salvation.
Foreknowledge and a Settled Future: The Question of Election and Predestination in an Open View of God
There exists no one account of predestination and election in openness theology. [14] The views espoused range from the apparent neglect of the doctrines to partial appropriations of the traditional Arminian renderings. The related doctrines of election and predestination, while not central to the open theist perspective, are impacted by its denial of exhaustive divine foreknowledge. A brief examination of the openness perspective on foreknowledge is in order for us to grasp its significance for the present discussion.
The Everlasting, Mutable, and Omniscient God
The conventional insistence on God’s exhaustive foreknowledge is tied up in the philosophical ideals of immutability and timelessness. Seeking to articulate the truth of the Being than which nothing greater can be thought classical theism enlisted Platonic and Aristotelian metaphysics. God is immutable, it has been argued, as any change in a perfect being could only be a change for the worse. Augustine argued that God has no experience of the passage of time "but beholds all things with absolute unchangeableness… he knows all times with a knowledge that time cannot measure." [15] To experience temporality is to experience change, as change is impossible for God, he is timeless. In the same way the timeless and immutable God must have exhaustive knowledge of the past, present, and future as any change in his knowledge would be a change in his being according to the tenet of divine simplicity. [16] Open theists object to this conception of a God who seems to exist ‘on the outside looking in’ with regard to time.
God is not timeless, it is argued, but "everlasting, having neither beginning nor end. This means that he is able to be involved in time and history… To think of God as timeless really threatens the whole biblical account." [17] An everlasting God does not sit on the outside looking in, but experiences the passage of time alongside his creation. Openness proponents aver that this resultant view is more in tune with the biblical account of God than the conventional view of God’s timelessness. Contra Anselm’s assertion that one cannot place God within the temporal continuum Hasker writes,
On the Anselmian view the crucifixion, the siege of Troy, the betrayal of Judas, the day of Pentecost, and the Nazi holocaust are all occurring now in the eternity of God; nothing new ever happens, and nothing old, however worthy of being forgotten, is left behind. This, I submit, is profoundly inconsistent with the thoroughly temporal and historical outlook that permeates the biblical text. [18]
In razing the conventional conception of divine timelessness open theists have allowed the falling edifice to knock down its sister structures, divine immutability and impassibility. At ground zero they have constructed, not a memorial to a lost deity, but an account of God grounded in scriptural descriptions of the divine pathos and genuine interaction with creation. In this they have received little criticism. It is the open theist answers to the question that follows this progression which has caused consternation among evangelicals. The question: If God is everlasting rather than timeless, and thus experiences the temporal flow, what is the extent of his omniscience? The open theist answer: God has exhaustive knowledge of the past and present, but has limited knowledge of the future. Unravelling the thought behind this will take a few movements.
Open theists see a parallel between omniscience and omnipotence. The extent of divine omnipotence has been recognised widely to be delimited by the character of God and the logically possible. [19] In this view God can neither act in a manner contrary to his character nor make a triangle with four sides. Similarly, openness theology argues, God’s omniscience is complete in that he knows all that logically can be known. [20] The extent of this knowledge is not a settled matter for open theists. [21] However we may generalise and in fairness say that openness theology denies that God has exhaustive foreknowledge, but affirms his present-knowledge. [22]
This delimitation of the extent of God’s knowledge of the future is predicated on the free will of creatures. It is not logically possible for one free being to have infallible knowledge of the future actions of another free being. [23] Such knowledge, it is argued, would infringe upon the freedom of the other being, as the future would in some way be settled, their actions already decided. There is little distinction to be made between foreknowledge and determinism in openness theology. Indeed, Gregory Boyd uses the words ‘predetermine’ and ‘foreknow’ interchangeably. [24] What is at stake here, writes Clark Pinnock, is whether or not there is "room for us to participate in shaping the future as disciples in the service of God." [25] In order to acknowledge the legitimacy of genuine human interaction with God and participation in the divine plans the notion of exhaustive foreknowledge is rejected.
As the future is the realm of possibility according to free action, it is not yet settled, it is open. It is this aspect of the position which accords it the nomenclature of ‘openness.’ There is a riskiness to this view of the future which creates a sense of unease for some evangelicals who have found comfort in the notion that God knows a future which is as yet unknown to us. To assess this ‘risk’ and draw out some of the nuances of the open theist view we now turn to the task of reconciling the God who risks by virtue of his limited foreknowledge with the biblical language of predestination and election and the conventional evangelical theologies thereby understood.
Predestination, Election, and the Unknown
Conventional evangelical theology has for the most part enlisted God’s exhaustive foreknowledge in its various articulations of the doctrines of predestination and election. The debated question has been the ordering of predestination and foreknowledge. For the traditional Calvinist predestination occurs by the virtue of God’s inscrutable decree, not on the basis of his foreknowledge,
We, indeed, ascribe both prescience and predestination to God; but we say that it is absurd to make the latter subordinate to the former… By predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. [26]
Contrary to this is the perspective from the evangelical Arminian tradition which asserts that God’s knowledge of our actions is predicated by our action, thus predestination, when it is construed as particular or individual predestination, is dependent upon divine foreknowledge. [27] Hence Arminius was to write that God’s predestinarian decree "has its foundations in the foreknowledge of God, by which he knew from all eternity those individuals who would, through his preventing grace, believe, and, through his subsequent grace would persevere." [28] Although the notion of a predestinarian decree is no longer central to Arminian theology today, the view of predestination on the basis of foreknowledge for the most part remains. One argument for the Arminian view is that foreknowledge is an attribute of God, essential to his being, and that predestination and election are actions of God, the outworking of his attributes. Thus predestination is conditional and informed by foreknowledge (appeal is commonly made to Romans 8:29 to support this view). This is the general shape of the argument set forth by Arminians when attempting to articulate a theology of particular election. Arminian theologies of corporate predestination may side-step the issue of divine foreknowledge, this will be considered shortly.
The incompatibility of these accounts of particular predestination with the divine omniscience defined by openness theology should at this point be apparent. The extent of human proliferation, the existence and identity of individual persons are contingent upon the exercise of free will and thus lie outside the scope of divine foreknowledge, a stance which offends the sovereignty of God manifest in both the exhaustive foreknowledge of God and the indiscriminate predestination of individuals according to the Calvinist position. [29] A lesser affront is experienced by Arminian theology, nonetheless the openness account of God does not include the knowledge necessary to predestine according to the traditional Arminian line.
The way forward for open theism in regard to these doctrines is not yet clear. Nonetheless, as we have seen, the consistent application of the hermeneutic which prioritises the most literal possible interpretation of scripture over philosophical formulations applied to theology proper by open theists requires that biblical language be taken seriously as openness theology broadens its horizons beyond the doctrine of God. Ignoring the biblical language of predestination and election does not seem to be an option if the prime tenets of open theism are to be taken seriously. Thus we are brought to consider two accounts of predestination and election offered by open theists.
Clark Pinnock
Perhaps the best-known open theist, Pinnock offers little to clarify the openness interpretations of the doctrines of predestination and election. The brief account of election offered by Pinnock in Most Moved Mover is opaque. Initially he presents election as a corporate affair. God did not elect individual persons, but a people, "Individuals receive their own election by becoming part of the elect body." [30] Such teaching is not uncommon to Arminian thought, and for Pinnock this is a convenient way to overcome the potential conflict in resolving the limited foreknowledge of God with the predestinarian statements of scripture. After all, in Pinnock’s thought God’s knowledge of the future extends to "what he has decided to do and what will inevitably happen but [God is] less certain about what creatures may freely do." [31] Thus God predestines a church into which individuals, by their own grace enabled free will, may enter and thus become elect by participating in the elect church.
Were he merely to posit that God elects and predestines a church, and not individuals, Pinnock’s account may theologically satisfy conventional Arminians at first glance. However, appropriating the Wesleyan-Arminian theology of the resistibility of grace he contends, "the election of individuals is not irresistible." [32] The window into Pinnock’s thoughts on predestination suddenly frosts up. Here Pinnock is presenting a cooperative, or synergistic account of the election of individuals. [33] With this assertion the lucidity is gone from Pinnock’s account. He seems unable to commit either to corporate election or particular conditional election. Perhaps Pinnock’s brief treatment belies his ambivalence toward these contentious doctrines, or, more fairly, his uncertainty with regard to their resolution.
The reason for this uncertainty may lie in Pinnock’s account of foreknowledge which extends God’s knowledge of the future as far as his plans and will. God knows what he will do, but not what other free agents will do. On this is based the open theist doctrine that the future is partly settled (what God will do) and partly open (what other free agents will do). [34] At this point a question is raised: If God’s knowledge of the future extends to his actions, and election is an action of God, what is the extent of God’s knowledge of the elect? There are numerous possible answers. Were Pinnock to commit to corporate election, the answer would be simple, God’s knowledge is not of individuals, but of the gathered whole. However, questions of determinism regarding the possibility of God electing a Church with certainty and maintaining the absolute freedom of individuals at this point arise. Namely, how is the freedom of individuals maintained if God’s plan to establish a Church is unilaterally decided in advance and a part of his settled foreknowledge?
Conversely, were election construed as particular and conditional, the question again arises whether or not God has foreknowledge of the particular objects of God’s action. The answer, from Pinnock’s perspective, is obscured by the assertion that God’s future action is foreknown without a clear sense of the extent of God’s knowledge of the particulars of this action. If God knows the action with certainty and precision but not the objects of the action it is unclear in Pinnock’s account how this is different from the indiscriminate unilateral action of the deterministic God open theism is seeking to avoid. We are thus left wanting.
Gregory Boyd
Boyd gives more space to dealing with the biblical statements on election and predestination than does Pinnock. With regard to the notion of Christian election unto salvation, Boyd gives a clearer account. Predestination is cooperative, and corporate. Boyd writes, "God predestined and foreknew the Church without predestining or foreknowing which specific individuals would belong to it." [35] The choice to be ‘in Christ’ brings the individual into the fold of the predestined elect.
It would seem that the above argument against Pinnock’s account again applies. However, Boyd’s argument goes slightly more in depth. He draws on quantum mechanics to demonstrate that "things can be somewhat predictable while incorporating unpredictable elements." [36] Thus, it is contended, God is able to predestine events such as the crucifixion without predestining the individuals who would enact the execution. Resonances with the theology of eminent particle physicist and theologian John Polkinghorne are heard in such statements of Boyd.
However, Boyd’s appropriation of science may be hasty and overly definitive. Polkinghorne humbly describes chaotic systems as presenting a "glimmer of hope of beginning to describe agency, both human and divine." [37] Indeed, the outcomes of chaotic systems may not be as determinate as Boyd seems to assume: "The future behaviour of a chaotic system is not totally haphazard. It displays a kind of orderly disorder. What will happen is not predictable but it is confined within a large but restricted range of possibilities." [38] There is a realm of possibility as to the behaviour of a chaotic system, but this is less determinate than the outcomes that God wills and brings about in Boyd’s theology: "The future is settled to the extent that God decides to settle it. God is not at the mercy of chance or free will." [39] Yet a degree of chance exists in chaotic systems. In Boyd’s thought, God could predetermine and foreknow all, but chooses not to out of love and respect for human free will. [40] Polkinghorne more consistently appropriates chaos theory to articulate a theology of creation as kenosis that makes for a far less determinate future and a more subtle account of the "interweaving of providential and creaturely causalities." [41]
Devoid of his appeal to quantum theory, Boyd’s argument arrives at the impasse present in Pinnock’s theology regarding determinism and corporate election. Indeed, Boyd’s theology may even be more vulnerable to this criticism due to his insistence that God’s intended actions are in no way constrained by human free will.
Boyd proceeds to expound an interpretation of ‘foreknowledge’ in connection to predestination in Romans 8:29. Paul’s intention, contends Boyd, was not to indicate that God possessed information, rather he used the language of knowledge in the Semitic sense of intimate love. [42] God did not foreknow individuals, so much as he foreloved his Church. Yet, again, Boyd’s concept of limited divine foreknowledge creates a problem. How is it that God can love that which he does not know? In this sense God’s love would be not so much for his Church, but for the idea of his Church. That is, God’s love would be of his own intent and will and not an authentic love of particular individuals. The concern here is that the object of God’s love is a concept, and the individual recipient of God’s love is the one who chooses to participate in that concept. It would be hard to describe a more abstract and impersonal notion of love. From the conventional perspective we may say that the notion of foreloving may be best left as a beautiful double entendre. However, such a criticism may be unfair as it is offered on grounds external to the openness perspective.
At this point we leave our examination of openness perspectives on predestination and election to offer a constructive account for possible future development. Suffice it to say that while most open theists offer some form of corporate election contingent upon human appropriation of grace, a comprehensive account that integrates fully with the extent of omniscience proffered by open theists is yet to be given. [43]
Risky Election
Four possible future directions present themselves as potential resolutions to the question of predestination and election within an openness theology:
1. Openness theology could forgo an account of predestination and election; or
2. Foreknowledge could be redefined along the lines of middle-knowledge in terms of infallible knowledge of contingent possibilities (counterfactuals); or
3. A clearer distinction between foreknowledge and determinism could be made allowing for the acceptance of a broader, or even exhaustive, account of foreknowledge; or
4. Predestination and election could be defined in terms of risk and hope, which are universal in their scope.
The first option repeals itself on the basis that it would undermine the hermeneutic employed to construct the theology of divine attributes presented by open theism and thus would undo the entire enterprise. The second and third options require a redefinition of one of prime tenets of openness theology, foreknowledge. Fairness to the openness perspective requires that as little revision as possible to its position be made in resolving this question. Thus, while the most consonant with conventional Arminian theology, these options rescind themselves on these grounds. [44]
One option remains from the proposed four, predestination and election as risk and hope. Such a view does not require any major revision of the open theist tenets and utilises the openness concept of risk. Let us then, briefly explore what shape an election of risk might have.
Describing election as risky implies that a risk is taken on the part of some party. In affirming both God’s present-knowledge and his absolute respect of the free will of his creatures to the exclusion of the possibility of exhaustive foreknowledge, any statement regarding God’s plans for the future entails some sense of risk that the plan will not be actualised according to God’s intent or may fail entirely. An election of risk entails the possibility that none may turn to God, yet such an outcome is improbable.
This outcome is improbable because an election of risk is founded in divine-human love. [45] This foundation is provided in the doctrine of creation. It asserts that God’s creative intent entails creature-Creator relations of reciprocal love. This propensity for love is awakened in the creature upon encounters with the divine Spirit and increases the probability of reciprocal love, that is, the actuality of election. Such an account of election is necessarily synergistic, although grounded in the prevenience of God’s election. Just as love achieves fullness in reciprocity, so does election come to fullness in the individual’s returned election of God.
In this sense, a predestination of risk is not narrow and particular, but broad and universal. [46] Predestination is aligned less with God’s intended unilateral action to bring individuals to himself or to create a Church, and more with God’s universal salvific intent. An election of risk redefines predestination as God’s desire for his creatures. The question of God’s knowledge of the objects of predestinarian action are thus muted as predestination is construed in terms of intent, not specific action. In this view predestination does not need to be resolved with Pinnock’s account of omniscience which extends to knowledge of God’s future actions. It is the creaturely response to the Creator’s overtures of love which brings one to a state of election. Thus God’s love for the elect is particular and concrete rather than abstract in that God’s universal predestination is played out in his particular advances of love toward his known creatures. Such advances are made on the basis of God’s present-knowledge.
This account does not preclude the assertions of some, such as Boyd, who seek to retain the possibility of God’s unilateral action or specific election unto certain tasks or roles as seems to be evidenced in particular scriptural narratives. The focus of an election of risk falls upon the authentic desire of God for the reciprocal love between his creatures and himself that is salvation. However, the strength and breadth of God’s love, which is essential to his being, restrains him from the unilateral imposition of this salvation upon unwilling creatures. An election of risk is also capacious enough to accommodate those who would further limit the extent of God’s omnipotence.
An election of risk begins with the love of one for another and entails the risk that such love will never be returned. This broad love of God is his election of all known people that achieves fullness only when it is reciprocated in what we might call the individual’s grace-enabled response to the prevenient grace of God. To say that God’s love, with his election, achieves fullness in loving response is not to diminish the love of God or to say that it is somehow lacking apart from the creaturely response, but to describe the appropriate end of such love. God’s love is complete in its perichorectic mutuality among the persons of the Godhead. The ample love of God, when directed toward creaturely beings, chances falling short of its desired outcome. Love and election contemporaneously achieve fullness in reciprocity, yet a tangible risk is involved. Such an account does not succumb to the unilateral imposition of a predestined Church upon a potentially unwilling people. In fact, it is consonant with the trajectory of open theist thought and offers no offense to its account of divine foreknowledge.
Conclusion
Open theist accounts of predestination and election that are conscious of the impact of their revision of omniscience are scarce. In this paper it has been suggested that such an account is necessary on the basis of the hermeneutic applied by openness theology. There exists in the account offered of election as risk no coercion, no unilateral action that would undermine the freedom of the creature, and no compromise on the open theist account of omniscience or risk. This account is theologically and systematically constructed by a person who sits outside the open theist camp, and would be furthered by an exegetical examination to determine if it is truly in accord with the scriptural hermeneutic of open theism. Nonetheless, it may serve to orient open theism toward a favourable resolution on this question and thus answer one more objection from conventional Arminians. The elect may then once again sleep well at night as the Spirit witness with our spirits in reciprocal love.
Notes
[1] Also called openness theology and free-will theism. This paper will favour the interchangeable nomenclature of openness theology and open theism.
[2] A debate has been underway in recent years to determine whether our orthodoxy is broad enough to encompass the open view. To ascribe to open theism the language of heterodoxy or heresy is to make a judgement I do not believe we are ready to make, particularly in the evangelical sphere. Clark Pinnock has frequently expressed his hope that Pentecostalism may embrace the open view of God.
[3] Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God's Openness, (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2001), 27.
[4] According to Pinnock, love is the real issue, not freedom. However, in the open view the strength of love necessitates libertarian freedom. Thus it is appropriate to focus on the open theist perspective on freedom while noting its roots in love. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 45. Although it is problematic, for the sake of ease this paper will use the nomination of ‘Arminian’ to refer to non-Calvinist evangelical Christians.
[5] The parties involved are aware of the divergences. Pinnock identifies foreknowledge as the point of departure for openness theology from Wesleyan-Arminianism. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 106-07.
[6] Although perhaps a poor delimitation, this paper is generous in its assessment of the limits of evangelicalism. The clarifying factor in this assertion is that this paper will not attempt to critique open theism from a Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, or Liberal Protestant perspective.
[7] There is a distinction to be made between predestination unto salvation and the predestination that we might see in prophetic statements. This paper will deal with the former; the latter is more proper to the functional specialities of interpretation and history. For such an account see Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000).
[8] Evangelicals operate under the assumption of the priority of scripture in theology and Christian life, hence works such as Kevin Vanhoozer’s mostly excellent The Drama of Doctrine somewhat uncritically argue that tradition is valid when it is biblical: "Church tradition accorded supreme authority to Scripture… The irony, then, is that many of those today who speak up for tradition turn a deaf ear to what tradition has actually handed down concerning the supremacy of Scripture." In turn, it seems, Vanhoozer and other evangelicals have turned a deaf ear to the history of interpretation and the hermeneutic passed down by tradition. Which party, it may be asked, is the most selective in that which it chooses to receive from tradition? Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005), 164-65.
[9] Hence the widespread suspicion regarding natural theology.
[10] William Hasker, "The Absence of a Timeless God," in God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle and David M. Woodruff, (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 202.
[11] According to Pinnock, we must let scripture dictate our theistic metaphysics. Pinnock is quite comfortable describing the traditional Greek metaphysics that have informed so much of theology as a "pagan inheritance." Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 64.
[12] For example, John Sanders suggests that Jesus’ inability to perform miracles in Nazareth in Mark’s gospel demonstrates God’s reliance on human factors in enacting his plans and the limit of his power apart from this conditioning. Furthermore it seems that Jesus did not anticipate the lack of faith that he found there. Although this example may be explained as an example of incarnational kenosis many other biblical situations are identified which appear to support the argument of the openness perspective. John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence, 2nd Edition, (Downers Grove: IVP, 2007), 100.
[13] This ‘literal’ scriptural hermeneutic is not to be taken as a propositional reading of scripture, but of taking the contents of scriptural passages seriously according to their context and genre.
[14] As with many new theologies, it is pointed out that "the open view is a research program, not a settled model clearly defined in every way." Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 179.
[15] Augustine, City of God XI, 21, in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 18, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins, trans. Marcus Dods, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1952), 333.
[16] Divine simplicity is the classical idea that God is simple in that he is without parts. It is commonly articulated by saying that God’s being is identical with his attributes. An account of God’s unchanging knowledge according to the doctrine of divine simplicity can be expressed in the following syllogism: God’s being is identical with his knowledge, a change in his knowledge would be a change in his being, therefore his knowledge does not change.
[17] Clark H. Pinnock, "God Limits His Knowledge," in Predestination and Free Will: Four Views on Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, ed. David Basinger and Randall Basinger, 141-62, (Downers Grove: IVP, 1986), 156.
[18] It is interesting to note that Hasker’s lack of historical sequence in listing these events unsettles the temporal sensibilities in the reader. Implicit in this listing is the logic of temporal order. Hasker, "The Absence of a Timeless God," 202. Emphasis in original.
[19] Even this view does not remove the paradoxes inherent to omnipotence when construed as limitless power and ability. For instance, the paradox, "can God create a stone too heavy for himself to lift?" cannot be answered adequately according to the rules of logic without undoing this sense of omnipotence.
[20] William Hasker, "An Adequate God," in Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue between Process and Free Will Theists, ed. John B. Cobb Jr. and Clark H. Pinnock, 215-45, (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), 218.
[21] Some of the differing perspectives on the extent of divine foreknowledge will be raised in the examination of predestination and election. The epistemological issue here is that in order for foreknowledge to be described rightly as ‘knowledge’ it must be true. Hence, foreknowledge must be knowledge of what will be, not what might be.
[22] Here present-knowledge is understood as comprehensive knowledge of the past and present and exhaustive foreknowledge as comprehensive knowledge of the future. It should be noted that there is not complete agreement among open theists as to the reason that God’s omniscience does not extend to exhaustive knowledge of the future. The view outlined in this paper expresses the dominant open theist perspective. Others, such as Dallas Willard, believe that God limits his own knowledge for the sake of human freedom. Millard J. Erickson, What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?: The Current Controversy Over Divine Foreknowledge, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 220. For a discussion on present-knowledge see Richard Rice, God's Foreknowledge and Man's Free Will (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2004).
[23] Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 100.
[24] Boyd, God of the Possible, 40.
[25] Furthermore, Pinnock rejects the ‘guilt by association’ arguments made against openness theology as a form of Socinianism or process theism by asserting the openness commitment to trinitarian theology and the ontological independence of God. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 107.
[26] John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge, Vol. II (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1989), 206.
[27] Bruce Reichenbach makes the case that "it is because (in a noncausal sense having to do with our knowledge) the event occurs that God believes it occurs. But then one cannot turn around and make the event depend on God’s knowledge of the event." Bruce Reichenbach, "God Limits His Power," in Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, ed. David Basinger and Randall Basinger, 101-24, (Downers Grove: IVP, 1986), 110. This view is not to claim faith in Christ as a meritorious act on the part of the individual, however the defense of such a view is outside the scope of this paper.
[28] James Arminius, On Predestination, in The Works of James Arminius, Vol. 1, trans. James Nichols, 211-53 (Auburn: Derby, Miller, and Orton, 1853), 248.
[29] Although, interestingly enough, the lack of any substantial distinction between determinism and foreknowledge proffered by open theists to support their case against exhaustive foreknowledge is shared by some Calvinists in making their argument for determinism. In the Calvinist account, the relationship is non-causal, foreknowledge is not the basis of determinism. Nonetheless, exhaustive foreknowledge is assumed and the case is made that "if God actually knows what will (not just might) occur in the future, the future must be set and some sense of determinism applied. God’s knowledge is not the cause of the future, but it guarantees that what God knows must occur." John Feinberg, "God Ordains All Things," in Predestination and Free Will: Four Views on Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom, 17-43, (Downers Grove: IVP, 1986), 32. Emphasis in original.
[30] Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 164.
[31] Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 47.
[32] Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 165.
[33] He describes synergism with relation to election as the majority Christian view and as necessary to defend any notion of God’s authentic relationality with his creatures. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 167.
[34] Pinnock, Most Moved Mover, 101.
[35] Boyd, 46.
[36] Boyd, 45.
[37] John Polkinghorne, "Kenotic Creation and Divine Action," in The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. John Polkinghorne, 90-106 (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2001), 100.
[38] Polkinghorne, 99. Emphasis added.
[39] Boyd, 31.
[40] The retention of omnipotence in the sense of the possibility of divine intervention in the world has been a criticism levelled at open theism by process theologians, "Could we, in the presence of burning children, proclaim that God ‘remains gloriously free’ to intervene in history? Do we want to say that, just as a parent can snatch its child from the path of a speeding vehicle, God could have snatched the Jews from the trains to Auschwitz – but failed to do so?" David Ray Griffin, "Process Theology and the Christian Good News: A Response to Classical Free Will Theism," in Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue Between Process and Free Will Theists, ed. John B. Cobb Jr and Clark H. Pinnock, 1-38, (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), 16.
[41] Polkinghorne, 105.
[42] Boyd, 48.
[43] Sanders, for example, dedicates much space to the notion of election, and concludes in favour of a corporate, conditioned election. A position typical of conventional Arminian theology. However he never quite gets around to resolving this with the issue of foreknowledge in the openness perspective. Sanders, 256.
[44] Sanders describes middle-knowledge as problematic for philosophical reasons. The epistemological objection to middle-knowledge concerns whether or not it is possible to verify the truthfulness of counterfactual assertions. Sanders, 220. Some, such as Boyd, affirm God’s infallible knowledge of probabilities while not necessarily embracing middle-knowledge. Boyd, 61. For a partially favourable assessment of middle-knowledge from an openness perspective see David Basinger, The Case for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assessment, (Downers Grove: IVP, 1996), 43-48. The inseparability of divine foreknowledge and determinism in openness theology is a divergence from conventional Arminian theology and is in fact closer to the Calivinist perspective. Nonetheless it is a viewed shared among the majority of open theists and thus must be respected for the purposes of this paper.
[45] Rice asserts, "Because God loves the creatures, he is open to their experiences… Love also involves affirming and valuing the other." Richard Rice, "Process Theism and the Open View of God: The Crucial Difference," in Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue Between Process and Free Will Theists, ed. John B. Cobb Jr. and Clark H. Pinnock, 163-200, (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), 184.
[46] The universal dimension of predestination in this account does not amount to universalism (which most open theists reject) but it is the desire of God that all might be saved. This is in line with conventional Arminianism which emphasises the authentic love of God for all of his creatures including his desire for their redemption.